Türkiye’s Goods Trade, 2024–2026

Türkiye’s trade record from 2024 to mid-2026 depicts an export-oriented manufacturing economy operating in volatile global conditions, but also a wider external deficit. Exports grew in both completed calendar years. Imports fell in 2024, rose faster than exports in 2025 and then edged higher during the first five months of 2026. Industrial depth supports foreign sales, while energy, intermediate inputs, gold and domestic demand continue to shape the import bill.

Under TurkStat’s general trade system, provisional 2024 exports rose 2.4% to US$261.855 billion and imports fell 5.0% to US$344.020 billion. Turnover was US$605.875 billion and the deficit narrowed 22.7% to US$82.165 billion. The export-to-import coverage ratio improved from 70.6% to 76.1%. Manufacturing represented 94.1% of exports by economic activity, while intermediate goods accounted for 69.3% of imports. Türkiye largely exports manufactured products, but production and consumption still rely heavily on imported inputs.

In 2025, exports increased 4.4% to US$273.361 billion and imports 6.2% to US$365.370 billion. Turnover reached US$638.731 billion, the deficit widened 11.9% to US$92.009 billion and coverage slipped to 74.8%. Germany was the leading export market at US$22.167 billion, while China was the largest import source at US$49.576 billion. This geography connects Türkiye simultaneously to European final demand and Asian supply chains.

The opening months of 2026 were restrained. Provisional January–May exports were US$111.118 billion, 0.2% higher year on year, and imports US$153.834 billion, up 1.1%. Turnover reached US$264.952 billion; the deficit grew 3.6% to US$42.716 billion and coverage fell to 72.2%. Unadjusted May exports and imports declined sharply year on year, while the calendar-adjusted series rose. Holidays and working-day effects can distort a single month, making the five-month aggregate the more useful signal.

The industrial mix creates resilience and concentration. Automotive, chemicals, steel, machinery, textiles, clothing and food processing connect Turkish suppliers to multiple value chains. The Trade Ministry reported first-quarter exports of US$63.3 billion. Türkiye Exporters Assembly data put March automotive exports at US$3.3 billion, chemicals at US$3.0 billion and steel at US$1.6 billion; the Ministry reported US$28.3 billion in exports to the European Union over the quarter. These figures provide sector context, while TurkStat’s general-trade series remains the basis for annual comparison.

Business expectations were cautious. The Ministry’s second-quarter survey placed the export expectation index at 99.1, just below the neutral level of 100, and the import index at 104.9. This survey records the expectations of firms engaged in foreign trade rather than realised flows, but it was consistent with an environment in which import pressure could remain firmer than export momentum.

Integration with the European Union is the central political-economic fact. The Customs Union removes tariffs and quantitative restrictions for covered industrial products and requires broad alignment with European trade and technical rules. It does not cover every good: agriculture operates under preferences, while coal and steel follow a separate framework. In July 2026, Türkiye proposed in Brussels that the EU use a “Made with Europe” approach to recognise integrated automotive and manufacturing chains. This was Türkiye’s policy proposal, not an adopted EU framework. Local-content rules, procurement and subsidies can redirect trade even without a conventional border tariff.

Geopolitics reaches Türkiye through energy, payments, demand and logistics. Middle East disruption can raise fuel, freight and insurance costs for an energy-importing manufacturer. Russia’s weight among import sources increases exposure to energy prices, payment infrastructure and sanctions compliance. US and EU tariffs or local-content measures can redirect automotive, steel and machinery orders. Türkiye’s location can capture diverted flows, though congestion and compliance risks may erode the advantage.

Türkiye’s competitive proposition rests on manufacturing capability, customs and standards expertise, multimodal logistics and proximity to Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. Its structural weakness is not an absence of exports but persistent import intensity and a large goods deficit. Durable improvement requires productivity, higher technological content, diversified energy, deeper domestic supply and predictable European market access.